Existing equilibrium concepts for games make use of the subjective expected utility model axiomatized by Savage [28] to represent players' preferences. Accordingly, each player's beliefs about the strategies played by opponents are represented by a probability measure. Motivated by experimental findings such as the Ellsberg Paradox demonstrating that the beliefs of a decision maker may not be representable by a probability measure, this paper generalizes equilibrium concepts for normal form games to allow for the beliefs of each player to be representable by a closed and convex set of probability measures. The implications of this generalization for strategy choices and welfare of players are studied. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81.
INTRODUCTION
Due to its simplicity and tractability, the subjective expected utility model axiomatized by Savage [28] has been the most important theory in analysing human decision making under uncertainty. In particular, it is almost universally used in game theory. Using the subjective expected utility model to represent players' preferences, a large number of equilibrium concepts have been developed. The central one being Nash Equilibrium.
On the other hand, the descriptive validity of the subjective expected utility model has been questioned, for example, because of Ellsberg's [10] famous mind experiment, a version of which follows. Suppose there are two urns. Urn 1 contains 50 red balls and 50 black balls. Urn 2 contains 100 balls. Each ball in urn 2 can be either red or black but the relative proportions are not specified. Consider the four acts listed in Table I . Ellsberg argues that the typical preferences for the acts are f 1 tf 2 o f 3 tf 4 , where the strict preference f 2 o f 3 reflects an aversion to the``ambiguity'' or ``Knightian uncertainty'' associated with urn 2. Subsequent experimental studies generally support that people are averse to ambiguity. (A summary can be found in Camerer and Weber [6] .) Such aversion contradicts the subjective expected utility model, as is readily demonstrated for the Ellsberg experiment. In fact, it contradicts any model of preferences in which underlying beliefs are represented by a probability measure. (Machina and Schmeidler [23] call such preferences``probabilistically sophisticated.'' In this paper, I reserve the term``Bayesian'' for subjective expected utility maximizer.)
The Ellsberg Paradox has motivated generalizations of the subjective expected utility model. In the multiple priors model axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler [15] , the single prior of Savage is replaced by a closed and convex set of probability measures. The decision maker is said to be uncertainty averse if the set is not a singleton. He evaluates an act by computing the minimum expected utility over the probability measures in his set of priors.
Although the Ellsberg Paradox only involves a single decision maker facing an exogenously specified environment, it is natural to think that ambiguity aversion is also common in decision making problems where more than one person is involved. Since existing equilibrium notions of games are defined under the assumption that players are subjective expected utility maximizers, deviations from the Savage model to accommodate aversion to uncertainty make it necessary to redefine equilibrium concepts. This paper generalizes Nash Equilibrium and one of its variations in normal form games to allow the beliefs of each player to be representable by a closed and convex set of probability measures as in the Gilboa Schmeidler model. The paper then employs the generalized equilibrium concepts to study the effects of uncertainty aversion on strategic interaction in normal form games.
Note that in order to carry out a ceteris paribus study of the effects of uncertainty aversion on how a game is played, the solution concept we use for uncertainty averse players should be different from that for Bayesian players only in terms of attitude towards uncertainty. In particular, the solution concepts should share, as far as possible, comparable epistemic conditions. That is, the requirements on what the players should know about each other's beliefs and rationality underlying the new equilibrium concepts should be``similar'' to those underlying familiar equilibrium Win 8100 if the ball drawn from urn 1 is black f 2 Win 8100 if the ball drawn from urn 1 is red f 3 Win 8100 if the ball drawn from urn 2 is black f 4 Win 8100 if the ball drawn from urn 2 is red concepts. This point is emphasized throughout the paper and is used to differentiate the equilibrium concepts proposed here from those proposed by Dow and Werlang [9] and Klibanoff [18] , also in an attempt to generalize Nash Equilibrium in normal form games to accommodate uncertainty aversion. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of the multiple priors model and a discussion of how it is adapted to the context of normal form games. Section 3 defines Nash Equilibrium and one of its variants. Section 4 defines and discusses the generalized equilibrium concepts used in this paper. Section 5 makes use of the equilibrium concepts defined in Section 4 to investigate how uncertainty aversion affects players' strategy choices and welfare. Section 6 identifies how uncertainty aversion is related to the structure of a game. Section 7 discusses the epistemic conditions of the equilibrium concepts for uncertainty averse players used in this paper and compares them with those underlying the corresponding equilibrium notions for subjective expected utility maximizing players. Section 8 provides a comparison with Dow and Werlang [9] and Klibanoff [18] . The comparison also serves to clarify the implications for adopting different approaches for developing equilibrium notions for games with uncertainty averse players. Section 9 argues that the results in previous sections hold even if we drop the particular functional form of the utility function proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler [15] but retain some of its basic properties. Some concluding remarks are offered in Section 10.
PRELIMINARIES

Multiple Priors Model
In this section, I provide a brief review of the multiple priors model and a discussion of some of its properties that will be relevant in later sections. For any topological space Y, adopt the Borel _-algebra 7 Y and denote by M(Y) the set of all probability measures over Y. 1 Adopt the weak* topology on the set of all finitely additive probability measures over (Y, 7 Y ) and the induced topology on subsets. Let (X, 7 X ) be the space of outcomes and (0, 7 0 ) the space of states of nature. Let F be the set of all bounded measurable functions from 0 to M(X).
2 That is, F is the set of two-stage, horse-raceÂroulette-wheel acts, as in Anscombe and Aumann [1] . involves (probabilistic) risk but no uncertainty. For notational simplicity, I also use p # M(X) to denote the constant act that yields p in every state of the world, x # X, the degenerate probability measure on x, and | # 0, the event [|] # 7 0 . The primitive p is a preference ordering over acts. The relations of strict preference and indifference are denoted by o and t, respectively. Gilboa and Schmeidler [15] impose a set of axioms on p that are necessary and sufficient for p to be represented by a numerical function having the following structure: there exists an affine function u: M(X) Ä R and a unique, nonempty, closed and convex set 2 of finitely additive probability measures on 0 such that for all f, g # F, fp g min p # 2 | u b f dp min p # 2 | u b g dp. It is convenient, but in no way essential, to interpret 2 as``representing the beliefs underlying p ''; I provide no formal justification for such an interpretation.
The difference between the subjective expected utility model and the multiple priors model can be illustrated by a simple example. Suppose 0=[| 1 , | 2 ] and X=R. Consider an act f#( f (| 1 ), f (| 2 )). If the decision maker is a Bayesian and his beliefs over 0 are represented by a probability measure p, the utility of f is p(| 1 ) u( f (| 1 ))+p(| 2 ) u( f (| 2 )).
On the other hand, if the decision maker is uncertainty averse with the set of priors
Note that given any act f with u( f (| 1 ))>u( f (| 2 )), (| 1 , p l ; | 2 , 1&p l ) 3 can be interpreted as local probabilistic beliefs at f in the following sense.
There exists an open neighborhood of f such that for any two acts g and h in the neighborhood,
That is, the individual behaves like an expected utility maximizer in that neighborhood with beliefs represented by (| 1 , p l ; | 2 , 1&p l ). Similarly, (| 1 , p h ; | 2 , 1&p h ) represents the local probabilistic beliefs at f if u( f (| 1 ))<u( f (| 2 )). Therefore, the decision maker who``consumes'' different acts may have different local probability measures at those acts.
There are three issues regarding the multiple priors model that will be relevant when the model is applied to normal form games. The first concerns the decision maker's preference for randomization. According to the multiple priors model, preferences over constant acts, that can be identified with objective lotteries over X, are represented by u( } ) and thus conform with the von Neumann Morgenstern model. The preference ordering over the set of all acts is quasiconcave. That is, for any two acts f, g # F with ftg, we have :f+(1&:) gp f for any : # (0, 1). This implies that the decision maker may have a strict incentive to randomize among acts.
The second concerns the notion of null event. Given any preference ordering p over acts, define an event T/0 to be p -null as in Savage [28] :
In words, an event T is p -null if the decision maker does not care about payoffs in states belonging to T. This can be interpreted as the decision maker knows (or believes) that T can never happen. If p is expected utility preferences, then T is p -null if and only if the decision maker attaches zero probability to T. If p is represented by the multiple priors model, then T is p -null if and only if every probability measure in 2 attaches zero probability to T.
Finally, the notion of stochastic independence will also be relevant when the multiple priors model is applied to games having more than two players. Suppose the set of states 0 is a product space 0 1 _ } } } _0 N . In the case of a subjective expected utility maximizer, where beliefs are represented by a probability measure p # M(0), beliefs are said to be stochastically independent if p is a product measure: p=_
In the case of uncertainty aversion, the decision maker's beliefs over 0 are represented by a closed and convex set of probability measures 2. Let marg 0 i 2 be the set of marginal probability measures on 0 i as one varies over all the probability measures in 2. That is,
Following Gilboa and Schmeidler [15, pp. 150 151] , say that the decision maker's beliefs are stochastically independent if
That is, 2 is the smallest closed convex set containing all the product
Normal Form Games
This section defines n-person normal form games where players' preferences are represented by the multiple priors model. Throughout, the indices i, j, and k vary over distinct players in [1, ..., n]. Unless specified otherwise, the quantifier``for all such i, j, and k'' is to be understood. As usual, &i denotes the set of all players other than i. Player i's finite pure strategy space is S i with typical element s i . The set of pure strategy profiles is S#_ n i=1 S i . The game specifies an outcome function g i : S Ä X for player i. Since mixed strategies induce lotteries over X, we specify an affine function u^i : M(X) Ä R to represent payer i's preference ordering over M(X). A set of strategy profiles, outcome functions, and utility functions determine a normal form game (S i , g i , u^i) n i =1 . Let M(S i ) be the set of mixed strategies for player i with typical element _ i . The set of mixed strategy profiles is therefore given by _ n i=1 M(S i ). _ i (s i ) denotes the probability of playing s i according to the mixed strategy _ i , _ &i (s &i ) denotes > j{i _ j (s j ) and _ &i is the corresponding probability measure on S &i #_ j{i S j . Note that when players are Bayesians, _ i is sometimes interpreted as the probabilistic conjecture held by i's opponents about i's pure strategy choice. This paper adopts the view that uncertainty averse players have a strict incentive to randomize. 4 Therefore, _ i represents player i's conscious randomization. For example, suppose a factory employer has two pure strategies s=monitor worker 1 and s$=monitor worker 2. His decision problem is to choose a (possibly degenerate) random device to determine which worker he is going to monitor. (See Section 4.2 below for arguments for and against this approach.)
Assume that player i is uncertain about the strategy choices of all the other players. Since the objects of choice for player j is the set of mixed strategies M(S j ), the relevant state space for player i is _ j{i M(S j ), endowed with the product topology. Each mixed strategy of player i can be regarded as an act over this state space. If player i plays _ i and the other players play _ &i , i receives the lottery that yields outcome g i (s i , s &i ) with probability _ i (s i ) _ &i (s &i ). Note that this lottery has finite support because S and therefore [g i (s)] s # S are finite sets. It is also easy to see that the act corresponding to any mixed strategy is bounded and measurable in the sense of the preceding subsection. Consistent with the multiple priors model, player i 's beliefs over _ j{i M(S j ) are represented by a closed and convex set of probability measures B i . Therefore, the objective of player i is to
Define the payoff function u i : S Ä R as follows: u i (s)#u^i ( g i (s)) \s # S. A normal form game can then be denoted alternatively as (S i , u i ) n i=1 and the objective function of player i can be restated in the form
In order to produce a simpler formulation of player i 's objective function, note that each element in B i is a probability measure over a set of probability measures. Therefore, the standard rule for reducing two-stage lotteries leads to the following construction of B i M(S &i ):
The objective function of player i can now be rewritten as
Convexity of B i implies that B i is also convex. Further, from the perspective of the multiple priors model (2.1.1), (2.2.2) admits a natural interpretation whereby S &i is the set of states of nature relevant to i and B i is his set of priors over S &i . Because of the greater simplicity of (2.2.2), the equilibrium concepts used in this paper will be expressed in terms of (2.2.2) and B i instead of (2.2.1) and B i . The above construction shows that doing this is without loss of generality. However, the reader should always bear in mind that the former is derived from the latter and I will occasionally go back to the primitive level to interpret the equilibrium concepts.
EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPTS FOR BAYESIAN PLAYERS
This section defines equilibrium concepts for Bayesian players. The definition of equilibrium proposed by Nash [24] can be stated as follows:
such that
Under the assumption that players are expected utility maximizers, Nash proves that any finite matrix game of complete information has a Nash Equilibrium. It is well known that there are two interpretations of Nash Equilibrium. The traditional interpretation is that _ i * is the actual strategy used by player i. In a Nash Equilibrium, it is best for player i to use _ i * given that other players choose _* &i . The second interpretation is that _ i * is not necessarily the actual strategy used by player i. Instead it represents the marginal beliefs of player j about what pure strategy player i is going to pick. Under this interpretation, Nash Equilibrium is usually stated as an n-tuple of probability measures
Its justification is that given that player i 's beliefs are represented by _* &i , BR i (_* &i ) is the set of strategies that maximize the utility of player i. So player j should``think'', if j knows i 's beliefs, that only strategies in BR i (_* &i ) will be chosen by i. Therefore, the event that player i will choose a strategy which is not in BR i (_* &i ) should be``null'' (in the sense of Section 2.1) from the point of view of player j. This is the reason for imposing the requirement that every strategy s i in the support of _* i , which represents the marginal beliefs of player j, must be an element of BR i (_* &i ). The``beliefs'' interpretation of Nash Equilibrium allows us to see clearly the source of restrictiveness of this solution concept. First, the marginal beliefs of player j and player k about what player i is going to do are represented by the same probability measure _* i . Second, player i 's beliefs about what his opponents are going to do are required to be stochastically independent in the sense that the probability distribution _* &i on the strategy choices of the other players is a product measure. We are therefore led to consider the following variation. 
It is easy to see that if Second, in a Bayesian Beliefs Equilibrium, player i is allowed to believe that the other players are playing in a correlated manner. As argued by Aumann [3] , this does not mean that the other players are actually coordinating with each other. It may simply reflect that i believes that there exist some common factors among the players that affect their behaviour; for example, player i knows that all other players are professors of economics. 
When expressed in terms of B i , a Beliefs Equilibrium is an n-tuple of closed and convex sets of probability measures
where BR i (B i ) is the set of strategies which maximize (2.2.1). 6 The interpretation of Beliefs Equilibrium parallels that of its Bayesian counterpart. Given that player i 's beliefs are represented by B i , BR i (B i ) is the set of strategies that maximize the utility of player i. So player j should`t hink,'' if j knows i's beliefs, that only strategies in BR i (B i ) will be chosen by i. Therefore, the event that player i will choose a strategy that is not in BR i (B i ) should be``null'' (in the sense of Section 2.1) from the point of view of player j. This is the reason for imposing the requirement that every strategy _ i in the union of the support of every probability measure in marg M(si) B j , which represents the marginal beliefs of player j about what player i is going to do, must be an element of BR i (B i ).
It is obvious that every Bayesian Beliefs Equilibrium is a Beliefs Equilibrium. Say that a Beliefs Equilibrium [B i ] n i=1 is proper if not every B i is a singleton.
Recall that Nash Equilibrium is different from Bayesian Beliefs Equilibrium in two respects: (i) The marginal beliefs of the players agree and (ii) the overall beliefs of each player are stochastically independent. An appropriate generalization of Nash Equilibrium to allow for uncertainty aversion should also possess these two properties. Consider therefore the following definition.
We can see as follows that this definition delivers the two properties`a greement'' and``stochastic independence of beliefs.'' As explained in Section 2.2, player i's beliefs are represented by a closed and convex set of probability measures B i on _ j{i M(S j ). I require the marginal beliefs of the players to agree in the sense that marg M(Sj) B i =marg M(Sj) B k . To capture the idea that the beliefs of each player are stochastically independent, I impose the requirement that B i contains all the product measures. That is,
B i is derived from B i as in Section 2.2. By construction, we have marg Sj B i =marg Sj B k =convex hull of 7 j and B i takes the form required in the definition of Beliefs Equilibrium with Agreement.
Note that Beliefs Equilibrium and Beliefs Equilibrium with Agreement coincide in two-person games. Further, for n-person games, if
To provide further perspective and motivation, I state two variations of Beliefs Equilibrium and explain why they are not the focus of this paper. Given that any strategy in BR i (B i ) is equally good for player i, it is reasonable for player j to feel completely ignorant about which strategy i A Beliefs Equilibrium may not be a Strict Beliefs Equilibrium, as demonstrated in the following example. 7 The example also shows that a Strict Beliefs Equilibrium does not always exist, which is obviously a serious deficiency of this solution concept.
Example 3. Nonexistence of Strict Beliefs Equilibrium. The game in Table III only has one Nash Equilibrium, [U, L]. It is easy to check that it is not a Strict Beliefs Equilibrium. In fact, there is no Strict Beliefs Equilibrium for this game. K An opposite direction is to consider weakening the definition of Beliefs Equilibrium.
Definition 6. A Weak Beliefs Equilibrium is an n-tuple of beliefs
It is clear that any Beliefs Equilibrium is a Weak Beliefs Equilibrium. The converse is not true. If marg Si B j 3 BR i (B i ), there are some strategies (in j's beliefs about i) that player i will definitely not choose. However, player j considers those strategies``possible.'' On the other hand, marg Si B j & BR i (B i ){< captures the idea that player j cannot be``too wrong.'' Weak Beliefs Equilibrium is also not the focus of this paper because we do not expect much strategic interaction if the players know so little about their opponents. However, it will be discussed further in Section 7 (Proposition 8) and Section 8, where its relation to the equilibrium concepts proposed by Dow and Werlang [9] and Klibanoff [18] is discussed.
Discussion
a. Mixed strategies as objective randomization vs subjective beliefs. As pointed out earlier, a mixed strategy of a player is traditionally regarded as his conscious randomization. In recent years, a modern view of mixed strategies has emerged according to which players do not randomize. Each player chooses a definite action but his opponents may not know which one, and the mixture represents their conjecture about his choice.
Note that in games with Bayesian players, the two views are``observationally indistinguishable'' in the sense that they lead to the same set of Nash Equilibria. However, this is not necessarily the case for games with uncertainty averse players. For example, consider the game in Table IV. (For all two person games presented in this paper, player 1 is the row player and player 2 is the column player.) If player 1 is Bayesian, D is never optimal no matter whether he randomizes or not. Now suppose that player 1 is uncertainty averse. If he has a preference ordering represented by (2.2.2), then whatever his beliefs, the utility of the mixed strategy (U, 0.5; C, 0.5) is equal to 5 and the utility of D is only equal to 1. Therefore, D is also never optimal. On the other hand, if we assume that player 1 does not randomize and therefore has the choice set [U, C, D], then he will strictly prefer to play D rather than U and C if his beliefs are, say,
The above example demonstrates the necessity to re-examine the two views of mixed strategies when we consider games with uncertainty averse players. Such a re-examination is provided below. It also serves to justify the adoption of the traditional view in this paper.
One justification of the modern view is that the normal form game under study is repeated over time, where each player's pure strategy choices are independent and identically distributed random variables. A mixed strategy equilibrium can therefore be interpreted as a stochastic steady state. However, since uncertainty is presumably eliminated asymptotically, this repeated game scenario is of limited relevance for the present study of games with uncertainty averse players.
The standard objection to the traditional view also does not necessarily extend to games with uncertainty averse players. The argument against the traditional view is that since expected utility is linear in probabilities, Bayesian players do not have a strict incentive to randomize (see, for instance, Brandenburger [5, p. 91] ). However, when preferences deviate from the expected utility model, there may exist a strict incentive to randomize.
To see this, let us first go back to the context of single-person decision theory. Recall that p is a preference ordering over the set of acts F, where each act f maps 0 into M(X). The interpretation of f is as follows. First a horse race determines the true state of nature | # 0. The decision maker is then given the objective lottery ticket f (|). He spins the roulette wheel as specified by f (|) to determine the actual prize he is going to receive. Also recall that for any two acts f, f $ # F and : # [0, 1], :f+(1&:) f $ refers to the act which yields the lottery ticket :
Suppose p is strictly quasiconcave as in the Gilboa Schmeidler model and the decision maker has to choose between f and f $. Suppose further that he perceives that nature moves first; that is, a particular state |* # 0 has been realized but the decision maker does not know what |* is. If the decision maker randomizes between choosing f and f $ with probabilities : and 1&:, respectively, he will receive the lottery :f (|)+(1&:) f $(|) when |*=|. This is precisely the payoff of the act :f+(1&:) f $ in state |. That is, randomization enables him to enlarge the choice set from
Correspondingly, there will``typically'' be an : # (0, 1) such that :f+(1&:) f $ is optimal according to p . 8 On the other hand, suppose the decision maker moves first and nature moves second. If the decision maker randomizes between choosing f and f $ with probabilities : and 1&:, respectively, he faces the lottery ( f, :; f $, 1&:) that delivers act f with probability : and f $ with probability 1&:. Therefore, randomization delivers the set [( f, :; f $, 1&:) | :
is not in the domain of F and so the Gilboa Schmeidler model is silent on the decision maker's preference ordering over this set.
The above discussion translates to the context of normal form games with uncertainty averse players as follows. The key is whether player i perceives himself as moving first or last. The assumption of strict incentive to randomize can be justified by the assumption that each player perceives himself as moving last. On the other hand, if we assume that each player perceives himself as moving first, and has an expected utility representation for preferences over objective lotteries on F, then there will be no strict incentive to randomize. Since the perception of each player about the order of strategy choices is not observable and there does not seem to be a compelling theoretical case for assuming either order, it would seem that either specification of strategy space merits study. (See also Dekel et al. [8] for another instance where the perception of the players about the order of moves is important.)
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Another objection to the assumption of strict incentive to randomize that might be raised in the context of uncertainty is that it contradicts``Ellsberg type'' behaviour. The argument goes as follows. Suppose a decision maker can choose between f 3 and f 4 listed in Table I . If the decision maker randomizes between f 3 and f 4 with equal probability, it will generate the act [27, p. 693] ). Also, the preference pattern f 1 tf 2 o f 3 tf 4 is already sufficient to constitute one version of the Ellsberg Paradox. In this version, consideration of randomization is irrelevant. Therefore, assuming a strict incentive to randomize does not make every version of the Ellsberg Paradox disappear.
Finally, one standard defence of the interpretation of mixed strategies as objective randomization also makes sense in games with uncertainty averse players. That is, one may imagine a hypothetical``guide to playing games.'' Such a guide can certainly recommend a mixed strategy or a set of mixed strategies to each player.
b. Knowledge of beliefs. In common with the equilibrium concepts for Bayesian players presented in Section 3, Beliefs Equilibrium (with Agreement) assumes that each player knows his opponents' beliefs. Three possible justifications for this assumption are as follows. First, players' beliefs are derived from statistical information (which is not necessarily precise enough to be characterized by an objective probability measure). For instance, a salesman possesses statistical information about the bargaining behaviour of customers. If a customer also knows the information, then he knows the beliefs of the salesman (Aumann and Brandenburger [4, p. 1176] ). Second, players may learn about their opponents' beliefs through pre-game communication. For instance, suppose a player has two pure strategies X and Y. He may announce that he will choose X with probability between 0 and 1. In fact, Example 5 in Section 5 below illustrates that it may be strictly better for a player to make such a``vague'' announcement. This point is also discussed by Greenberg [16] . Finally, players' beliefs may be derived from public recommendation. A``guide'' suggests a set of strategies to each player publicly. After receiving the suggestion, each player chooses a strategy which is unknown to his opponents.
Admittedly, the above justifications may not be entirely convincing. For example, when two players receive the same statistical information which does not take the form of an objective probability measure, it is demanding to assume that their beliefs agree. However, without the assumption of agreement, it would be harder to justify that players know each other's beliefs, even though beliefs are derived from the same source of information. Nevertheless, note that the agreement assumption is equally strong if we restrict players to be Bayesians. In fact, if we allow players' beliefs to disagree, it seems even harder for Bayesian beliefs to be mutual knowledge. How can player i know the unique subjective probability measure representing the beliefs of player j ? To conclude, I acknowledge the limitation of the above story and, following Aumann and Brandenburger [4, p. 1176] , only intend to show that a player may well know another's conjecture in situations of economic interest.
c. Knowledge of rationality. As do their Bayesian counterparts, Beliefs Equilibrium (with Agreement) assumes mutual knowledge of rationality. That is, player j's beliefs about player i 's behaviour are focused on i's best response given i 's true beliefs. This can be justified by the assumption that players learn their opponents' rational behaviour from past observations. We can assume that past observations are obtained from previous plays of the same normal form game (which has not been repeated sufficiently often to eliminate all uncertainty about strategy choices). 9 Alternatively, we can assume that players' knowledge of opponents' rationality is derived from other sources. For example, before players i and j play a normal form game, i has observed that j was rational when j played a different game with player k.
Relationship with Maximin Strategy and Rationalizability
Finally it is useful to clarify the relationship between Beliefs Equilibrium defined in Section 4.1 and some familiar concepts in the received theory of normal form games.
Definition 7. The strategy _* i is a maximin strategy for player i if
The following result is immediate:
For player i, the set of Correlated Rationalizable Strategies is R i # n=0 1 n i . We call RB i # n=1 M(_ j{i supp 1 n&1 j ) the set of Rationalizable Beliefs.
These notions are related to Beliefs Equilibrium by the next proposition.
is a Beliefs Equilibrium. Then BR i (B i ) R i and B i RB i .
Proof. Set 1 0 i #M(S i ) and recursively define 
2. Does uncertainty aversion make the players worse off (better off)?
To deepen our understanding, let me first provide the answers to the above two questions in the context of single-person decision making and conjecture the possibility of extending them to the context of normal form games.
Single-Person Decision Making
The first question is: as an outside observer, can we distinguish an uncertainty averse decision maker from a Bayesian decision maker? The answer is obviously yes if we have``enough'' observations. (Otherwise the Ellsberg Paradox would not exist!) However, it is easy to see that if we only observe an uncertainty averse decision maker who chooses one act from a convex constraint set G F, then his choice can always be rationalized (as long as monotonicity is not violated) by a subjective expected utility function. For example, take the simple case where
Suppose the decision maker chooses a point c # C. To rationalize his choice by an expected utility function, we can simply draw a linear indifference curve which is tangent to C at c, with slope describing the probabilistic beliefs of the expected utility maximizer.
The above answer is at least partly relevant to the first question posed in Section 5.1. That is because in a normal form game, an outside observer only observes that each player i chooses a strategy from the set M(S i ). An important difference, though, is that the strategy chosen by i is a best response given his beliefs and these are part of an equilibrium. Therefore, it is possible that the consistency condition imposed by the equilibrium concept can enable us to break the observational equivalence.
The second question addresses the welfare consequences of uncertainty aversion: does uncertainty aversion make a decision maker worse off (better off)? There is a sense in which uncertainty aversion makes a decision maker worse off. For simplicity, suppose again that X=R. Suppose that initially, beliefs over the state space 0 are represented by a probability measure p^and next that beliefs change from p^to the set of priors 2 with p^# 2. Given f # F, let CE 2 ( f ) be the certainty equivalent of f, that is, u(CE 2 ( f ))=min p # 2 u b f dp. Similar meaning is given to CE p^( f ). Then uncertainty aversion makes the decision maker worse off in the sense that
That is, the certainty equivalent of any f when beliefs are represented by pî s higher than that when beliefs are represented by 2.
Note
Assume that the decision maker has a fixed preference ordering p * over M(X) which satisfies the independence axiom and is represented numerically by u. Denote by p and p $ the orderings over acts corresponding to the priors p^and 2, respectively. Then the above welfare comparison presumes that
11 When both players are uncertainty averse and they know that their opponents are uncertainty averse, can they choose a strategy profile that Pareto dominates equilibria generated when players are Bayesians?
Every Beliefs Equilibrium Contains a Bayesian Beliefs Equilibrium
In this section, the two questions posed in Section 5.1 are addressed using the equilibrium concepts Bayesian Beliefs Equilibrium and Beliefs Equilibrium. The answers are implied by the following proposition. Proof.
12
It is sufficient to show that there exists b i # B i such that BR i (B i ) BR i (b i ). This and the fact that
EQUILIBRIUM IN BELIEFS
11 A well-known example where this kind of reasoning applies is the following. An expected utility maximizer who is facing an exogenously specified set of states of nature always prefers to have more information before making a decision. However, this is not necessarily the case if the decision maker is playing a game against another player. The reason is that if player 1 chooses to have less information and if player 2``knows'' it, the strategic behaviour of player 2 may be affected. The end result is that player 1 may obtain a higher utility by throwing away information. (See the discussion of correlated equilibrium in Chapter 2 of Fudenberg and Tirole [14] .) 12 Though I prove a result (Proposition 12) below for more general preferences, I provide a separate proof here because the special structure of the Gilboa Schmeidler model permits some simplification.
We
Combining (5.3.1) and (5.3.2), we have
Illustrating Proposition 3. Consider the game in Table V . The sets of probability measures For games involving more than two players, a Beliefs Equilibrium in general does not contain a Nash Equilibrium. This is already implied by the fact that a Bayesian Beliefs Equilibrium is itself a Beliefs Equilibrium but not a Nash Equilibrium. However, since Bayesian Beliefs Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium are equivalent in two person games, Proposition 3 has the following corollary. 
The left-hand side of the above inequality is the ex ante utility of player i when his beliefs are represented by B i and the right-hand side is ex ante utility when beliefs are represented by b i . The inequality implies that ex ante, i would prefer to play the Bayesian Beliefs Equilibrium [
. In this ex ante sense, uncertainty aversion makes the players worse off. 13 
Uncertainty Aversion Can Be Beneficial When Players Agree
The comparisons above addressed the effects of uncertainty aversion when the equilibrium concepts used, namely Beliefs Equilibrium and Bayesian Beliefs Equilibrium, do not require agreement between agents. Here I re-examine the effects of uncertainty aversion when agreement is imposed, as incorporated in the Beliefs Equilibrium with Agreement and Nash Equilibrium solution concepts. For two-person games, the Corollary of Proposition 3 still applies since agreement is not an issue given only two players. However, for games involving more than two players, the following example demonstrates that it is possible to have a Beliefs Equilibrium with Agreement not containing any Nash Equilibrium. Note that the game is the prisoner's dilemma game if the inequalities a>c>b in (5.4.1) are replaced by a=b>c. (When a=b>c, the payoffs of players 1 and 2 for all strategy profiles do not depend on nature's move.) This game is different from the standard prisoners' dilemma in one respect. In the standard prisoners' dilemma game, the expression a=b>c says that it is always better for one player to play D given that his opponent plays C. In this game, the expression a>c>b says that if one player plays D and one plays C, the player who plays D may either gain or lose. The interpretation of the inequalities c>d>e in (5.4.1) is the same as that in the standard prisoners' dilemma. That is, it is better for both players to play C rather than D. However, a player should play D given that his opponent is the corresponding utility loss if the true state is YC 2 . Therefore, the interpretation of 2c<a+b is that if you know your opponent plays C, the possible gain (loss) for you to play D instead of C is high (low). Assume that players 1 and 2 know each other's action but they are uncertain about nature's move. To be precise, suppose that the beliefs of the players are (a+b), which contradicts the last inequality in (5.4.1). Therefore, it is never optimal for both Bayesian players to play C and any Nash Equilibrium requires both players to play D and therefore that both players receive d with certainty. In the Beliefs Equilibrium with Agreement constructed above, on the other hand, both players play C and receive c>d with certainty.
To better understand why uncertainty aversion leads to a better equilibrium in this game, let us go back to the beliefs [B 1 , B 2 ] of players 1 and 2. As explained in Section 2.1, although the global beliefs of players 1 and 2 on [X, Y] are represented by the same 2 in (5.4.2), the local probability measures for different acts may be different. For example, the local probability measure on [X, Y] at the act corresponding to D 1 is (X, p l ; Y, 1&p l ) and for D 2 it is (X, p h ; Y, 1&p h ), respectively. In the sense of local probability measures, therefore, players 1 and 2 disagree on the relative likelihood of X and Y when they are consuming the acts D 1 and D 2 , respectively. This allows playing D to be undesirable for both players.
The example delivers three messages. First, it shows that in a game involving more than two players, uncertainty aversion can lead to an equilibrium that Pareto dominates all Nash Equilibria. Second, interpreting player N in the above game as``nature,'' the game becomes a two-person game where the players are uncertain about their own payoff functions. Therefore, uncertainty aversion can be``beneficial'' even in two-person games. Third, the beliefs profile [B N , B 1 , B 2 ] continues to be a Beliefs Equilibrium with Agreement if, for instance, the payoff of player N is independent of his own strategy, but is the highest when player 1 plays C 1 and player 2 plays C 2 . In this case, even if players can communicate, player N has a strict incentive not to announce his own strategy. 14 The next question I want to address is: When should we expect (or not) the existence of an equilibrium reflecting uncertainty aversion? In the context of single-person decision theory, we do not have much to say about the origin or precise nature of beliefs on the set of states of nature. However, we should be able to say more in the context of game theory. The beliefs of the players should be``endogenous'' in the sense of depending on the structure of the game. For example, it is reasonable to predict that the players will not be uncertainty averse if there is an``obvious way'' to play the game.
K
The following two examples identify possible reasons for players to be uncertainty averse.
Example 6. Nonunique Equilibria. In the game in Table X , any strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium. Any [B 1 , B 2 ] is a Beliefs Equilibrium. Uncertainty aversion in this game is due to the fact that the players do not have any idea about how their opponents will play. K Example 7. Nonunique Best Responses. In the game in Table XI , [U, L] is the only Nash Equilibrium. However, it is equally good for player 1 to play D if he believes that player 2 plays L. Under this circumstance, it may be too demanding to require player 2 to attach probability one to player 1 playing U. At the other extreme, where 2 is totally ignorant of 1's strategy choice, we obtain the Proper Beliefs Equilibrium
This example shows that the existence of a unique Nash Equilibrium is not sufficient to rule out an equilibrium with uncertainty aversion. However, I can prove the following: [4] develop epistemic conditions for Nash Equilibrium. The purpose of this line of research is to understand the knowledge requirements needed to justify equilibrium concepts. Although research on the generalization of Nash Equilibrium to allow for uncertainty averse preferences has already started (see Section 8 below), serious study of the epistemic conditions for those generalized equilibrium concepts has not yet been carried out.
In this section, I provide epistemic conditions for the equilibrium concepts proposed in this paper. The main finding is that Beliefs Equilibrium (Beliefs Equilibrium with Agreement) and Bayesian Beliefs Equilibrium (Nash Equilibrium) presume similar knowledge requirements. This supports the interpretation of results in previous sections as reflecting solely the effects of uncertainty aversion.
Before I proceed, I acknowledge that although the partitional information structure used below is standard in game theory (see, for instance, Aumann [3] and Osborne and Rubinstein [25, p. 76] ), it is more restrictive than the interactive belief system used by Aumann and Brandenburger [4] . In their framework,``know'' means``ascribe probability 1 to'' which is more general than the``absolute certainty without possibility of error'' that is being used here (Aumann and Brandenburger [4, p. 1175] ). Apart from this difference, the two approaches share essentially the same spirit. There is a common set of states of the world. A state contains a description of each player's knowledge, beliefs, strategy, and payoff function. To respect the partitional information structure, the payoff function u i : 0_S Ä R and the strategy f i : 0 Ä M(S i ) are required to be adapted to H i . Given f i , f i (|)(s i ) denotes the probability that i plays s i according to the strategy f i in state |. For each | # 0, player i's beliefs over S &i are 469 EQUILIBRIUM IN BELIEFS 16 Another feature of the interactive belief system (Aumann and Brandenburger [4, p. 1164] ) that is shared by the model here is that players' prior beliefs are not part of the specification. Note that the common prior assumption in their paper is imposed only for their Theorem B (p. 1168).
represented by a closed and convex set of probability measures B i (|) that is induced from 2 i (|) in the following way:
The above specification is common knowledge among the players. Player i is said to know an event E at | if H i (|) E. Say that an event is mutual knowledge if everyone knows it. Let H be the meet of the partitions of all the players and H(|) the element of H which contains the element | The idea of Proposition 6 is not difficult. At |, player i knows j 's beliefs B j (|), payoff function BR j (|), and that j is rational. Therefore, any strategy f j (|$) for player j with |$ # H i (|), that player i thinks is possible, must be player j's best response given his beliefs. That is,
Since the preference ordering of player j is quasiconcave, any convex combination of strategies in the set 
to come from a common prior, mutual knowledge of rationality and payoff functions and common knowledge of beliefs are sufficient to imply Nash Equilibrium. In the case where players are uncertainty averse, the following proposition says that by restricting each player i to being completely ignorant at each | about the relative likelihood of states in H i (|), exactly the same knowledge requirements that imply Nash Equilibrium also imply Beliefs Equilibrium with Agreement. The specification of 2 i (|) as the set of all probability measures on H i (|) reflects the fact that player i is completely ignorant about the relative likelihood of states in H i (|). It is useful to explain the role played by this parametric specialization of beliefs. Given any state | and any event E, the beliefs [ p(E) | p # M(H i (|))] of player i about E at | must satisfy one and only one of the following three conditions.
p(E)=1 \p#M(H i (|)) if and only if
Therefore, player j knows i's beliefs about E if and only if one and only one of the following is true.
1. j knows that i knows E. 2. j knows that i does not know E or 0"E. 3. j knows that i knows 0"E.
As a result, mutual knowledge of beliefs about E implies agreement of beliefs about E. The common knowledge assumption in Proposition 7 is used only to derive the property of stochastically independent beliefs. 17 Note that Theorem B in Aumann and Brandenburger [4] is not a special case of Proposition 7. The common prior assumption imposed by their theorem coincides with the restriction on 2 i imposed by Proposition 7 only in the case where H i (|)=[|] \|. Therefore, the examples they provide to show the sharpness of their theorem do not apply to Proposition 7. To 
and
Their strategies are listed in Table XIII . 6) is not the main focus of this paper, it is closely related to the equilibrium concepts proposed by the papers discussed in Section 8 below. According to the following proposition, complete ignorance and rationality at a state | are sufficient to imply Weak Beliefs Equilibrium. 
is a Weak Beliefs Equilibrium. Note that Proposition 8 requires only that the players be rational; they do not need to know that their opponents are rational. They also do not need to know anything about the beliefs of their opponents.
RELATED LITERATURE
In this section, I compare my equilibrium concepts with those proposed by Dow and Werlang [9] and Klibanoff [18] . 18 Since the latter employs the same strategy space as in this paper, let me first conduct a direct comparison.
Klibanoff [18]
Klibanoff [18] also adopts the multiple priors model to represent players' preferences in normal form games with any finite number of players and proposes the following solution concept:
) is an Equilibrium with Uncertainty Aversion if the following conditions are satisfied:
_ i is the actual strategy used by player i and B i is his beliefs about opponents' strategy choices. Condition 1 says that player i 's beliefs cannot be``too wrong.'' That is, the strategy profile _ &i chosen by other players should be considered``possible'' by player i. Condition 2 says that _ i is a best response for i given his beliefs B i . 18 A brief review of other related papers is provided below. There are two other papers on generalizations of Nash Equilibrium. Lo [19] proposes Cautious Nash Equilibrium which, when specialized to the multiple priors model, refines the equilibrium concept in Dow and Werlang [9] . However, its main focus is on relaxing mutual knowledge of rationality, rather than uncertainty aversion. Mukerji [21] proposes the equilibrium concept Equilibrium in =-ambiguous Beliefs. The equilibrium concept only admits players' utility functions having a specific form but otherwise is identical to that in Dow and Werlang [9] . Epstein [11] and Mukerji [21] generalize rationalizability. The former requires common knowledge of rationality but the latter does not. For normal form games of incomplete information, Epstein and Wang [12] establish the general theoretical justification for the Harsanyi style formulation for non-Bayesian players. Lo [20] provides a generalization of Nash Equilibrium in extensive form games. All the above papers either adopt the multiple priors model or consider a class of preferences that includes the multiple priors model as a special case. 19 The equilibrium concept presented here is a simplified version. Klibanoff [18] assumes that players' beliefs are represented by lexicographic sets of probability measures.
EQUILIBRIUM IN BELIEFS
In addition, the following refinement of Equilibrium with Uncertainty Aversion is offered in his paper.
) is an Equilibrium with Uncertainty Aversion and Rationalizable Beliefs if it is an Equilibrium with Uncertainty Aversion and, in addition, B i RB i (defined in Definition 8). That is, player i believes that his opponents' strategy choices are correlated rationalizable.
Although Klibanoff 's equilibrium concepts involve both the specification of beliefs and the actual strategies used by the players, while the equilibrium concepts in my paper involve only the former, the main differences between them can be summarized in terms of beliefs in four aspects as shown in Table XIV . It enables us to conclude that Beliefs Equilibrium with Agreement is a refinement of Klibanoff 's equilibrium concepts.
is a Beliefs Equilibrium with Agreement, then for any _ i # marg Si B j , it is the case that
) is an Equilibrium with Uncertainty Aversion and Rationalizable Beliefs.
Since knowledge of rationality and beliefs is the most essential property underlying the equilibrium concepts, let us focus on two-person games where agreement and stochastic independence are not the issues. The following example illustrates that an Equilibrium with Uncertainty Aversion and Rationalizable Beliefs may not be a Beliefs Equilibrium.
Example 9. Refinement of Klibanoff [18] . The game in Table XV is deliberately constructed so that every strategy of every player survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Therefore, Klibanoff 's standard equilibrium concept coincides with his own refinement. It is easy to check that
] is a Equilibrium with Uncertainty Aversion (and Rationalizable Beliefs). This equilibrium predicts that D and R to be the unique best response for players 1 and 2, respectively. As a result, player 1 receives 2 and player 2 receives 5. It is reasonable that player 2 will play R. The reason is that R is as good as L and C if 2 plays U and it is strictly better than L and C if 2 plays D. However, if player 1 realizes this, 1 should play U, and as a result, both players will receive 10 
Dow and Werlang [9]
Dow and Werlang [9] consider two-person games and assume that players' preference orderings over acts are represented by the convex capacity model proposed by Schmeidler [29] . Any such preference ordering is a member of the multiple priors model (Gilboa and Schmeidler [15] ). Their equilibrium concept can be restated using the multiple priors model as follows.
Definition 10. [B 1 , B 2 ] is a Nash Equilibrium Under Uncertainty if the following conditions are satisfied:
Dow and Werlang [9] interpret condition 1 as saying that player j`k nows'' that player i will choose a strategy in E i . Condition 2 says that every s i # E i is a best response for i, given that B i represents i's beliefs about the strategy choice of player j.
Unlike Klibanoff and this paper, Dow and Werlang restrict players to choosing pure rather than mixed strategies. It is therefore important to reiterate the justification for using one strategy space instead of the other. According to the discussion in Section 4.2, the use of pure vs mixed strategy spaces depends on the perception of the players about the order of strategy choices. The adoption of a mixed strategy space in Klibanoff [18] and in this paper can be justified by the assumption that each player perceives himself as moving last. On the other hand, we can understand the adoption of a pure strategy space in Dow and Werlang [9] as assuming that each player perceives himself as moving first and has an expected utility representation for preferences over objective lotteries on acts. Further comparison of Dow and Werlang [9] and this paper is provided in the next subsection.
Epistemic Conditions
I suggested in the introduction that in order to carry out a ceteris paribus study of the effects of uncertainty aversion on how a game is played, we should ensure that the generalized equilibrium concept is different from Nash Equilibrium only in one dimension, players' attitude towards uncertainty. In particular, the generalized solution concept should share comparable knowledge requirements with Nash Equilibrium. According to this criterion, I argue in Section 7 that the solution concepts I propose are appropriate generalizations of their Bayesian counterparts. Dow and Werlang [9] and Klibanoff [18] do not provide epistemic foundations for their solution concepts and a detailed study is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I show below that in the context of two-person normal form games, exactly the same epistemic conditions that support Weak Beliefs Equilibrium as stated in Proposition 8, namely, complete ignorance and rationality, also support Nash Equilibrium Under Uncertainty and Equilibrium with Uncertainty Aversion. Therefore, the sufficient conditions for players' beliefs to constitute an equilibrium in these two senses do not require the players to know anything about the beliefs and rationality of their opponents.
The weak epistemic foundation for their equilibrium concepts is readily reflected by the fact that given any two-person normal form game, [M(S 2 ), M(S 1 )] is always a Nash Equilibrium Under Uncertainty and there always exist _ 1 and _ 2 such that (_ 1 , _ 2 , M(S 2 ), M(S 1 )) is an Equilibrium with Uncertainty Aversion. The equilibrium notions in these two papers therefore do not fully exploit the difference between a game, where its payoff structure (e.g., dominance solvability) may limit the set of``reasonable'' beliefs, and a single-person decision making problem, where any set of priors (or single prior in the Bayesian case) is``rational.'' In fact, Dow and Werlang [9, p. 313] explicitly adopt the view that the degree of uncertainty aversion is subjective, as in the single-agent setting, rather than reasonably tied to the structure of the game. As a result, their equilibrium concept delivers a continuum of equilibria for every normal form game (see their theorem on p. 313).
Let me now proceed to the formal statements. Recall that Klibanoff 's standard equilibrium concept can be readily rewritten as a Weak Beliefs Equilibrium (Proposition 10). It follows that Proposition 8 provides the epistemic conditions underlying Klibanoff's equilibrium concept as simplified here.
Since Dow and Werlang [9] adopt a pure strategy space, I keep all notation from Section 7 but redefine
That is, f i (|) is the pure action used by player i at | and B i (|) is the set of probability measures on S j induced from 2 i (|) and f j . It represents the beliefs of player i at | about j 's strategy choice.
Proposition 11. Suppose that at some state |, 2 i (|)=M(H i (|)) and that the players are rational. Then [B 1 , B 2 ] is a Nash Equilibrium Under Uncertainty.
When a decision maker's beliefs are represented by a probability measure p, an event E is p -null if p(E)=0. It is well recognized that when preferences are not probabilistically sophisticated, there are alternative ways of defining nullity. The equilibrium concepts in Dow and Werlang [9] , Klibanoff [18] , and this paper can all be regarded as generalizations of Nash Equilibrium if the``right'' notion of nullity is adopted. To see this, first assume that each player does not have a strict incentive to randomize. Take S &i to be the state space of player i and S i to be a subset of acts which map S &i to R. Suppose that p i represents the preference ordering of player i over S i . Player i is rational if he chooses s i such that s i p i s^i \s^i # S i . The following is an appropriate restatement of Nash Equilibrium in terms of preferences: [9] and Klibanoff [18] are equivalent to Definition 11 if the notion of nullity in Dow and Werlang [9] is adopted: an event is p j -null if it is attached zero probability by at least one probability measure in B j . 20 The above discussion may lead the reader to think that the epistemic conditions provided for the equilibrium concepts in Dow and Werlang [9] and Klibanoff [18] are biased by using the notion of knowledge that is only appropriate for the equilibrium concepts proposed in this paper. Therefore, it is worth reiterating that the conditions stated in Propositions 8 and 11 do not require the players to know anything about their opponents' beliefs and rationality. Therefore, the notion of knowledge to be adopted is irrelevant. Moreover, Propositions 8 and 11 do not even exploit the fact that the information structure is represented by partitions. The two propositions and their proof continue to hold as long as the beliefs of player i at | are represented by the set of all probability measures over an event H i (|) 0 with the property that | # H i (|). Therefore, the conclusion that complete ignorance and rationality imply the two equilibrium concepts remains valid even in the absence of partitional information structures.
MORE GENERAL PREFERENCES
The purpose of this section is to show that even if we drop the particular functional form proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler [15] but retain some of its basic properties, counterparts of this paper's equilibrium concepts and results can be formulated and proven.
Let us first go back to the context of single-person decision theory and define a class of utility functions that generalizes the multiple priors model. Recall the notation introduced in Section 2.1, whereby p is a preference ordering over the set of acts F, where each act maps 0 into M(X). Impose the following restrictions on p : Suppose that p restricted to constant acts conforms to expected utility theory and so is represented by an affine u: M(X) Ä R. Suppose that there exists a nonempty, closed, and convex set of probability measures 2 on 0 such that p is representable by a utility function of the form
for some function V: R 2 Ä R. Assume that p is monotonic in the sense that for any f, g # F, if u b f dp> u b g dp \p # 2, then fo g. Say that p is multiple priors representable if p satisfies all the above properties. Quasiconcavity of p will also be imposed occasionally.
Two examples are provided here to clarify the structure of the utility function U in (9.1). Suppose there exists a probability measure + over M(0) and a concave and increasing function h such that
In this example, the set of probability measures 2 corresponds to the support of +. The interpretation of the above utility function is that the decision maker views an act f as a two-stage lottery. However, the reduction of compound lotteries axiom may not hold (Segal [30] ). Note that this utility function satisfies quasiconcavity. Another example for U which is not necessarily quasiconcave is the Hurwicz [17] Quasiconcavity of preference implies that BR i (B i ) is a convex set. Therefore, there exists an element _ i # BR i (B i ) such that the support of _ i is equal to the union of the support of every probability measure in Generalizations of Nash Equilibrium have already been proposed by Dow and Werlang [9] and Klibanoff [18] to partly answer questions 3, 4, and 5. One important feature of the equilibrium concepts presented in this paper that is different from Dow and Werlang [9] but in common with Klibanoff [18] is the adoption of mixed instead of pure strategy space. They can both be justified by different perceptions of the players about the order of strategy choices. On the other hand, I can highlight the following relative merits of the approach pursued here. A distinctive feature of the solution concepts proposed in my paper is their epistemic foundation, which resemble as closely as possible those underlying the corresponding Bayesian equilibrium concepts. As pointed out by Dow and Werlang [9, p. 313] , their equilibrium concepts are only``presented intuitively rather than derived axiomatically.'' In my paper, some epistemic conditions are also provided for the equilibrium concepts proposed by Dow and Werlang [9] and Klibanoff [18] . The weakness of their equilibrium concepts is revealed by the fact that the epistemic conditions do not involve any strategic considerations. This point was demonstrated in Section 8.3 where I noted that in any normal form game, regardless of its payoff structure, the beliefs profile [M(S 2 ), M(S 1 )] constitutes an equilibrium in their sense. 
